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SA YING NO TO STAKEHOLDING 
Jeffrey S. Lehman* 
Deborah C. Malamud** 
THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY. By Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 296. $26. 
"What if America were to make good on its promise of equal opportunity 
by [XXX]? That's the bold proposal set forth by Yale law professors 
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott . . .. "1 
The quotation above is from the Yale University Press announce­
ment describing Bruce Ackerman2 and Anne Alstott's3 new book, with 
one change: we have substituted "[XXX]" for the authors' catch­
phrase summary of their proposal. What do you think the missing 
words might be? How would you enable America "to make good on 
its promise of equal opportunity"? 
As you ponder that question, you might consider the following fea­
ture of the Ackerman/ Alstott proposal. It calls for the federal gov­
ernment to spend an additional $255 billion per year (p. 35). Perhaps 
that is not surprising; perhaps you might have trouble spending much 
less if you wanted to make good on the promise of equal opportunity. 
So what would Ackerman and Alstott do? 
We believe that it is easiest to grasp the full import of their pro­
posal by considering its impact on the lives of five hypothetical young 
Americans. Below is each individual's situation without the 
Ackerman/ Alstott plan: 
., Alan is born to a single mother in a desperately poor neighbor­
hood of Chicago. His mother dropped out of high school and 
works odd jobs at minimum wage. They live in a housing project. 
Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan, he receives inadequate 
health care and a very poor education in the public schools. He 
* Dean of the Law School and Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of 
Michigan. A.B. 1977, Cornell; M.P.P. 1981, J.D. 1981, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
** Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Wesleyan; J.D.1986, Uni­
versity of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Forty Acres, A Mule, and $80,000: Making Equal Opportunity a Reality, YALE BOOK 
NEWS (Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, CT) (announcing the April 12, 1999 publication date 
for THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY), at 1. 
2. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School. 
3. Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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drops out of school in the tenth grade and lives his adult life on 
the fringe of the formal economy. 
• Bonita is born overseas in a poor developing country. Her family 
emigrates to the United States when she is twelve, settling in 
Arlington, Virginia. Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan, 
Bonita receives adequate health care and a decent public school 
education. She learns English quickly and is an excellent student 
in high school. Her parents have trouble finding jobs that pay 
well enough to support the family, but they manage. Upon 
graduation, Bonita cannot take the risk of borrowing money for 
college for fear that she will become dependent on her family. 
She decides to go right to work as a legal secretary. 
· 
• Carolyn is born to a working-class couple in Pittsburgh. Her par­
ents rent a comfortable apartment in a safe neighborhood. They 
have no accumulated wealth and live frugally, but they are able to 
make ends meet. Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan, she 
receives acceptable health care through her father's company 
HMO and a tolerable public school education. She is not a par­
ticularly strong student, but she finishes high school. She works 
in retail sales for four years before going back to community col­
lege for two years, eventually becoming a medical technician. 
• Dierdre is born to a middle-class academic couple in Newton, 
Massachusetts. Her parents make monthly mortgage payments 
on a comfortable house in a safe neighborhood. Without the 
Ackerman and Alstott plan, she receives very good health care 
and a fine education in an excellent suburban public school sys­
tem. She is not a particularly strong student in high school, so she 
attends and completes her four years of college at the University 
of Massachusetts - a good school, to be sure, but not as prestig­
ious or as highly regarded as the most selective private universi­
ties her top-of-the-class high school friends attend. She does well 
there, majoring in economics. With help from her family, she se­
cures a two-year entry-level job in her field, and then earns an 
M.B.A. from Columbia. She becomes a successful financial ana­
lyst for a large mutual fund group. 
• Edward is born to a wealthy professional couple in New York 
City. He grows up in a Greenwich Village brownstone. Without 
the Ackerman and Alstott plan, he enjoys the privileges of 
wealth: the finest health care extant, private nannies and tutors, 
elite private education from kindergarten through high school, 
box seats at the Yankees and the Metropolitan Opera, worldwide 
travel in limousines and on private jets. He is a superb student, 
goes to Yale College and Yale Law School, joins a top-ranked 
law firm (one with which his family has been associated for gen-
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erations), moves in-house with a major corporation, and eventu­
ally becomes its C.E.O. 
These stylized hypotheticals capture a disquieting truth about 
American society: we do not have equal opportunity. Some 
Americans barely have the shadow of a chance to succeed; some must 
live with the consequences of their mistakes; some find their mistakes 
forgiven; others are insulated from ever making mistakes at all. For 
some Americans, the prospect of an upper-middle-class adulthood is 
extremely remote; for others it is virtually assured; in between, there is 
an enormous range. 
So, here is what Ackerman and Alstott would do: 
1. Each of the five children would grow up in the same circum­
stances that he or she would have grown up in without the plan. There 
would be absolutely no change in any child's circumstances until his or 
her eighteenth birthday, at the very earliest. 
2. As soon as they reach their eighteenth birthdays, Dierdre and 
Edward (and any other college-bound young adult) would each re­
ceive $20,000 cash each year from the federal government, for four 
consecutive years, for an undiscounted total of $80,000 (this $80,000 
"stake," received over four years, is the source of the book's title). 
3. As soon as she reaches her twenty-first birthday, Carolyn (and 
any other high school graduate who does not attend college) would re­
ceive $20,000 cash each year from the federal government, for four 
consecutive years. She would also receive three years' worth of inter­
est on each payment, to reflect that she had to wait longer than 
Dierdre and Edward to get her money. 
4. As soon as he reaches his twenty-first birthday, Alan (and any 
other high school dropout who has not been convicted of a serious fel­
ony) would receive $4,000 cash each year from the federal govern­
ment, for as long as he remains crime-free. In addition, he could have 
more immediate access to up to the "full" $80,000 in distributions 
from the federal government, but only for certain limited purposes: 
buying a house, going back to school, or paying extraordinary medical 
expenses. 
5. Bonita will never be eligible to receive a stake. Only citizens 
are eligible for stakeholding, and even a citizen must have lived in the 
United States for at least eleven of her first twenty-one years to qual­
ify. She will fall short by two years and get nothing.4 
4. The same rule applies to young adults born in the United States of America to par­
ents whose families spend too many years abroad pursuing private-sector overseas interests. 
The reason for the rule in cases like Bonita's is political expediency; the reason for its exten­
sion to the American-born is the possibility of constitutional challenge. See pp. 46-47. 
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This program of stake distribution is the core of the 
Ackerman/Alstott plan, and we shall henceforth refer to it as AAP. 
AAP is part of a larger program that includes other elements as well 
- a payback scheme (pp. 77-93), a financing scheme (pp. 94-112), and 
a related but severable program for retirement funding (pp. 129-54). 
But AAP is enough to occupy us here. 
It seems self-evident to us that AAP cannot begin to "make good 
on America's promise of equal opportunity." In many ways it would 
seem to distribute opportunity even less equally than it is distributed 
today. Thus, in our example, Alan and Bonita would seem to be even 
more disadvantaged relative to Edward and Dierdre than they are 
without AAP. Edward and Deirdre would have started life with social 
and economic advantages even without their stakes; stakeholding adds 
to their existing resources. Alan and Bonita started out disadvantaged 
and are made relatively more so in relation to stakeholders in their 
age cohort: Bonita because she has no stake, and Alan because re­
strictions on his access to stake funds diminish his ability to put them 
to good economic use.5 
So what exactly is going on in this book? We shall approach that 
question in two steps. First, we argue that AAP is best understood not 
as a counterproductive plan for equalizing opportunity (which, we 
admit, was our first reaction to it), but rather as the legitimate off­
spring of two normative impulses: Ackerman and Alstott's commit­
ment to "antipatemalistic liberalism" and their desire for "fair oppor­
tunity." Second, we take a critical look at some aspects of the authors' 
self-presentation that, in all candor, stand in the way of efforts to give 
the book the generous reading any serious work of scholarship de­
serves. 
5. There is no reason to think that schooling, house-buying, and extraordinary medical 
expenses are the only, or even the most, sensible uses of funds for non-high-school-graduates 
seeking to survive in the market. For example, it would be a perfectly rational use of stake 
principal, in communities with poor public transportation, for dropouts to use stake principal 
to purchase and maintain a car as an aid in gaining and keeping employment. Other rational 
uses of stake principal abound that the authors exclude. And the alternatives they permit 
might be among the least sensible. As to home-buying, it is highly unlikely that high school 
dropouts will have the savings or credit ratings to purchase homes. See Statistical Abstract 
of the United States Table No. 756 (stating that median yearly earnings for persons with 9 to 
12 years of education but no diploma are $16,818 for males and $8,861 for females). And 
they may well not be able to afford homes in neighborhoods in which house values keep 
pace with general market inflation. If dropouts do buy homes, they may rapidly lose their 
equity if they cannot use their stake principal to cover mortgage payments and other ex­
penses during spells of unemployment. As to medical expenses, impoverished high school 
dropouts with children may be eligible for Medicaid, which since 1996 has operated on dif­
ferent terms from cash welfare. See generally <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/meligib.htm>. 
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*** 
The Stakeholder Society makes many references to the ideal of 
equal opportunity, but these references are not the proper point of en­
try into the book. To understand Ackerman and Alstott, one should 
begin with their statement that they stand for a "new liberalism." 
They want to combine "a commitment to individualism" with "an ap­
preciation of the pervasive impact of economic inequality" (pp. 21-22). 
To discern what the authors mean by "individualism," it is helpful 
to look outside the covers of The Stakeholder Society, and back to 
Ackerman's 1980 book, Social ]U,Stice in the Liberal State. In that 
book, he elaborated a particular brand of individualism as the central 
premise of liberalism, namely, "the liberal's opposition to paternal­
ism."6 In the course of that elaboration, he set forth a series of inter­
related ideas. 
First, Ackerman presented his idea of undominated conversation: 
"A power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through a 
conversation in which some person (or group) must assert that he is 
(or they are) the privileged moral authority . . . .  "7 What kinds of con­
versational moves should be considered an assertion that one is "the 
privileged moral authority"? For Ackerman, such a move is one that 
violates his "Neutrality Principle": 
No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert: 
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any 
of his fellow citizens, or 
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically 
superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.8 
Under this Neutrality Principle, one may thus claim neither intrin­
sic superiority over one's dialogic partner nor access to a superior con­
ception of the good. Ackerman called for a liberal state structured to 
effectuate that Neutrality Principle as follows: 
A political community of diverse individuals can organize its power 
struggle consistently with Neutral discourse if it takes steps to assure 
that: 
a. No citizen genetically dominates another. 
b. Each citizen receives a liberal education. 
c. Each citizen begins adult life under conditions of material equality. 
d. Each citizen can freely exchange his initial entitlements within a 
flexible transactional network. 
6. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 {1980). Anne 
Alstott also embraces antipatemalistic liberalism in her recent writing. See Anne Alstott, 
Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE LJ. 967 {1999). 
7. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
8. Id. at 11. 
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e. Each citizen, at the moment of his death, can assert that he has ful­
filled his obligations of liberal trusteeship, passing on to the next 
generation a power structure no less liberal than the one he himself 
enjoyed. 
If a social world fulfilled all these conditions, I shall say that its inhabi­
tants enjoy the condition of undominated equality that is required by an 
undeviating insistence on liberal dialogic legitimacy.9 
Note here that within Ackerman's conception, the words ."undomi­
nated" and "equality" are linked.. Indeed, it is fair to say that the pri­
mary form of equality sought by Ackerman is a world in which people 
are equally undominated. Equal distribution of wealth at birth, 
equally available education, and other equalities are means to the end 
of equal undomination. 
Of course, the inhabitants of our world are far from enjoying the 
condition of undominated equality prescribed by Ackerman's 
" 'perfect' technology of justice."10 The real world is one in which 
some people inherit genetically determined illnesses and impairments 
that put them in a poor position to compete in liberal markets. Our 
real-world system of racial and gender inequality disadvantages those 
who are born nonwhite or nonmale. Our real-world educational sys­
tem fails to deliver to many even the most basic literacy and numeracy 
skills, let alone the capacity to participate in liberal political dialogue. 
And material inequality is so entrenched in our real world that only 
the most radically expropriatory . redistributive policies could set it 
straight, and - significantly for Ackerman - the resulting equality 
would last only until two sets of parents made choices that created ma­
terially unequal circumstances for their respective offspring. 
Those concerned with the real world, Ackerman argued, must de­
velop second-best and third-best compromises. The Stakeholder 
Society is instructively read as an experiment in compromise within 
the terms set forth by Social Justice in the Liberal State. 
One can, of course, imagine many .different ways to strike com­
promises in the real world. For example, one QJ.ight say that until the 
first three of Ackerman's five conditions11 are satisfied, we should re­
lax the fourth condition (free exchange) and we should be willing to 
allow society collectively to act paternalistically. More concretely, one 
might say that in order to promote a world of material equality at birth 
and liberal education throughout a person's formative years, our soci­
ety ought to override the choices that parents would otherwise make 
about how to live their lives and spend their resources. 
Ackerman and Alstott do not want to go there. They find "tradi­
tional forms of bureaucratic control" unattractive (pp. 9-10). They 
9. Id. at 28. 
10. Id. 
11. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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want "to break the hold of a familiar vision of the welfare state in 
America" (p. 8). They do not want to "transform stakeholding into 
yet another exercise in paternalistic social engineering" (p. 9) and 
"create an excuse for a vast new bureaucracy intervening in our lives" 
(pp. 9-10). 
In sum, Ackerman and Alstott want to propose a system that 
makes compromises, but does not compromise the antipaternalistic 
vision of individualism. The "undeviating" commitment in this project 
is to avoid having to say to a citizen, "I won't let you do what you want 
with the resources you have, however you may have come by them." 
It should be "up to each citizen - not the government - to decide 
how she will use" her resources (p. 3). Ideally, for Ackerman and 
Alstott, this rule applies not only to resources that citizens earn them­
selves, but also to resources that citizens obtain through government 
transfers. For Ackerman and Alstott, the phrase "economic indepen­
dence for all" (p. 11) does not mean freedom from dependency on the 
wage market.12 It means freedom from bureaucratic restrictions on 
one's economic choices. 
Of course, a rigid hands-off approach to individual choice is diffi­
cult to square with equal opportunity in a society that respects the 
family as a fundamental, autonomous unit of child socialization.13 
Newborns cannot spend money without help; some guardian -
familial or governmental - must do the spending for them. In this 
country, we leave that to parents. Yet, even if all parents in fact 
wanted to spend money in ways that would maximize their children's 
life chances (and of course they do not), not every parent would 
choose to do so in the same way (for starters, nobody really knows 
what it means to speak of "maximizing" a child's life chances). So in 
the end, children will reach adulthood in different positions. 
In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Ackerman argued that "un­
dominated equality" requires that each citizen begin adult life under 
conditions of material equality.14 That, of course, won't happen in the 
real world. And so, Ackerman and Alstott set for themselves the sec­
ond-best goal of allowing each citizen to begin adult life under condi­
tions of fair opportunity. The "liberal state . . .  must . . .  assure each 
citizen a level playing field when he enters the marketplace as an 
adult. Without this fair start, individual freedom for some is oppres­
sion for others" (p. 22). 
So, what is a "fair start"? What makes for a "level playing field" in 
adulthood? We read Ackerman and Alstott's understanding of these 
12. For further discussion of this phrase, see infra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
13. See generally, e.g., JAMES s. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE 
FAMILY {1983). 
14. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 28. 
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ideas as having both static and dynamic elements. The static element 
has to do with ensuring that (almost) everyone is placed above a mor­
ally significant baseline. The dynamic element has to do with ensuring 
that (almost) everyone is given incentives for which they can be held 
morally accountable. 
In its static sense, the notion of a "fair start" calls for us to examine 
where young adults end up under AAP. As we noted above, AAP has 
a tripartite benefits structure for its eligible beneficiaries - different 
benefits are bestowed upon the college-bound student, the non­
college-bound high school graduate, and the high school dropout.15 
Short-tenured immigrants - like Bonita - get nothing, and teenagers 
who commit crimes face the possibility of partial- or full-stake forfei­
ture (pp. 49-51). That structure obviously does not create a "level 
playing field" in a literal sense. Those most deeply injured by child­
hood inequality may find themselves caught up in the criminal justice 
system and will get no stake. Those who do not graduate from high 
school will only be able to use a small yearly allowance from their 
stake fund, for limited purposes that may not address their economic 
needs, and they will be substantially wors'e off, for that reason, than 
those who graduate from high school. High school graduates who are 
the only stakeholders in their poor families may yield to social pres­
sure and share their stakes, leaving little for their own needs. Better­
off high school stakeholders may keep their stakes for themselves, but 
they will remain worse off than college graduates whose stakes, at the 
very least, have assured them a larger income stream. Those whose 
financial resources are exhausted by college costs will be worse off 
than those for whom the college degree is just one more asset in a 
family-funded portfolio. Stakeholding raises the absolute level of 
economic resources available to all but the bottommost group, but 
keeps the other groups at the same distance from one another. 
What Ackerman and Alstott are seeking, however, is a level play­
ing field in a moral rather than an economic sense. They are estab­
lishing, for us and for themselves, a morally significant level of eco­
nomic endowment - a minimum standard above which differences in 
resources bear no moral relevance. They want to "revitalize the lib­
eral ideal of an independent, responsible, property-owning citizenry" 
(p. 46) - a concept in which a more robust model of economic equal­
ity has little place. "[E]conomic independence" (p. 24), in their narrow 
sense, means having the minimum resources necessary to avoid 
"short-termism" (p. 35) in the making of key life decisions in early 
adulthood. Once that minimum is provided, stakeholders are to be 
15. Whether or not one thinks the benefits are economically equivalent (because the 
AAP has somehow hit upon the perfect discount rate), they are nonetheless different. For a 
discussion of discount rates, see infra text accompanying note 23. 
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held fully accountable for their choices and results. Differences in re­
sources above the minimum do not enter the moral calculus at all. 
This minimum-standards notion of what "a level playing field" 
looks like does, in fact, have its place in American culture. One ver­
sion of the American conception of class is predicated on the notion 
that distinctions above an approved minimum make no difference. 
Once one is not poor in America, one is middle-class.16 All middle­
class people are assumed to be "solid individual achievers in an essen­
tially classless society composed of human beings engaged in bettering 
themselves."17 Those at the top of the middle class are presumed not 
to have gotten there by oppressing those at the bottom. All are seen 
as having real possibilities for economic mobility (downward or up­
ward), and, in this minimum-standards sense, all play on "a level 
playing field" (p. 22). In that sense, Ackerman and Alstott get the cul­
ture just right. 
But it would be a serious mistake to take at face value the 
American myth that all those who are not poor are basically the same. 
Notwithstanding that myth, Americans are capable of being ex­
quisitely sensitive to differences in resources and their reflection in 
patterns of consumption.18 The advertising industry has a detailed, 
empirically based sense of how subtle differences in consumption 
choices map onto important and durable social distinctions.19 That 
these relationships are superficially manipulable to a degree - we 
can, after all, use the short-term strategy of going into debt to appear 
better off than we are - does not make them less real.20 
Furthermore, even unperceived differences can have significant ef­
fects in the real world. A working-class parent may be satisfied with 
her child's high school because it offers one or two advanced place-
16. Americans lack a stable conception of a "working class," in part because for so many 
years the collar-color line was cross-cut by the income line (in the case of the high-earning 
unionized craft and industrial workers). For struggles over line-drawing for purposes of 
wage and hour legislation, as an example of the legal consequences of the complexity of class 
in the United States, see Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line­
Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998). 
17. BENJAMIN DEMOIT, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK 
STRAIGHT ABOUT CLASS 43 (1990). 
18. See, e.g., PAUL FuSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS 
SYSTEM 77-78 (1983); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and 
Caveats, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1847, 1883-85 (1996). Americans use absolute meanings of class 
(e.g., middle class means a managerial position or a college degree) for some purposes and 
"a relative-comparisons model that ranks people along a continuum of social standing" for 
others. See REEVE V ANNEMAN & LYNN WEBER CANNON, THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION 
OF CLASS 145 (1987). 
19. See, e.g., Kenneth Labich, Class in America, FORTUNE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 114, 116. 
20. Groups differ in their ability to develop "symbolic strategies . . .  to jam" the mes­
sages of class distinction: the middle classes have it, while the lower classes do not. Pierre 
Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class: On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups, 
32 BERKELEY J. Soc. 1, 12 (1987). 
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ment courses and sends a healthy percentage of its graduates to the 
local state college. She may herself have grown up in a poorer neigh­
borhood with worse schools, and all she sees is her family's upward 
mobility. That same parent may not be aware that the best suburban 
high school in the area offers twenty advanced placement courses, and 
sends a large proportion of its graduates to top private colleges and to 
the state's flagship university campus. These differences will matter to 
her child's life chances, even if she is protected by social segregation 
from having any knowledge of them. 
The data about income mobility during adulthood confirm the ex­
tent to which differences in starting points define different opportunity 
sets for Americans today. An adult between the ages of 22 and 39 
who was in the bottom fifth of the income distribution in 1968 had 
only a 20% chance of being in the top 40% in 1991; an adult who was 
in the top fifth had a 72% chance of being in the top 40% twenty-three 
years later.21 
Ultimately, we find it difficult to accept the notion that under AAP 
all of the remaining tilts in the playing field are morally irrelevant. 
But before we can say that we disagree with Ackerman and Alstott's 
claim that AAP creates a "fair start" (p. 22), we must consider the dy­
namic aspect of that term. The authors claim, and not without reason, 
that AAP will create a new incentive structure for long-tenured citi­
zens at the threshold of adulthood. (For Bonita and those in her situa­
tion, AAP unfortunately creates no new behavior incentives.) The 
authors contend that AAP's differential treatment of Alan (the high 
school dropout) and Carolyn (the stake-eligible high school graduate 
who does not attend a four-year college) is "fair" because it is a mor­
ally acceptable consequence of the choices they made. 
The dynamic sense of a "fair start" calls for us to examine whether 
AAP's static inequalities, both preserved and created, are morally ac­
ceptable consequences of individuals' prior behavioral choices. 
Ackerman and Alstott clearly believe they are. The best evidence 
comes from their treatment of people who do not complete high 
school and therefore are ineligible for an $80,000 "stake." 
Ackerman and Alstott would offer those who stay crime-free but 
do not finish high school a lifelong allowance of $4,000 per year.22 
Four thousand dollars a year is the economic equivalent of $80,000, 
but only if one uses a 5% discount rate; if one uses a discount rate de­
rived from, say, the S&P 500, $4,000 a year is worth only about 
21. See Peter Gottschalk & Sheldon Danziger, Family Income Mobility: How Much ls 
There and Has It Changed? 19 Focus, Summer-Fall 1998, at 20, 22 tbl. 2. 
22. Those who do not graduate from high school have access to the full $80,000 for cer­
tain paternalistically limited purposes. See supra note 5 for an explanation of why those 
limitations are unwise. 
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$36,000.23 Clearly, then, those who do not graduate from high school 
are financially punished for their failings by AAP. Ackerman and 
Alstott ground this decision in the proposition that such Americans 
have proved themselves to be lacking in "self-discipline" (p. 9) and 
therefore incapable of managing a stake. 
The authors seem to assume that self-discipline is the primary fac­
tor influencing high school graduation. But that assumption would 
seem to call for more evidence than Ackerman and Alstott provide. 
Why does self-discipline have more explanatory power than conflict in 
the home environment, violent neighborhoods and high schools, in­
adequate primary education, learning disabilities, or any of the myriad 
factors that correlate poverty with noncompletion of high school? Is 
there any evidence, using our hypothetical examples, that a Carolyn, 
who decides to finish high school, has more self-discipline than an 
Alan, who sees the inadequacy of his school and concludes that an ex­
tra two years of schooling in that environment won't aid his economic 
survival?24 
To be sure, it may well be that a poor teenager who completes a 
sorely inadequate high school program has more self-discipline than 
one who does not.25 But why is that the relevant comparison? It takes 
far less self-discipline to finish high school when your school creates a 
positive environment and when you come from a middle-class family 
that fully supports your right to have a childhood protected from out­
side demands. 
Moreover, if one's primary concern is with self-discipline, high 
school graduation seems a poor proxy for opposite reasons as well. 
The AAP does not seek out signs of lack of self-discipline among mid­
dle-class youth - for example, the "gentleman-C" record collected by 
a child capable of far better work. In our example, Dierdre is not 
punished for attending the University of Massachusetts because she 
failed to apply herself to her studies seriously enough to earn a spot at 
one of the Ivies. There is no suggestion of taking stakes away from the 
least self-disciplined young adults. Rather, they would be taken away 
23. The average rate of return on a diversified portfolio of large company stocks from 
the beginning of 1926 to the end of 1997 was 11 % per year. See Ibbotson Assocs., Stocks, 
Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 1998 Yearbook app. C, tbl. C-1 at 271 {1998). 
24. Note that Ackerman and Alstott fear that tying the stake to high school graduation 
will create enormous incentives for schools to lower graduation standards, and they would 
require high school graduates to pass a federal or state stake-eligibility examination in order 
to become stakeholders. See p. 38 n.*. The authors nowhere acknowledge that poorer stu­
dents attending poorer schools are far less likely to pass such an examination than are mid­
dle-class students, and that African-American students are particularly likely to be disadvan­
taged by the hypothetical tests. On the latter point, see THE BLACK-WHITE TEsT SCORE 
GAP {Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998). 
25. Even that is not certain. The high school graduate may have had fewer immediate 
wage-earning options to lure him away from school, or may have felt less responsibility to 
bring money into the household as soon as possible. 
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from those (mostly poor) young adults who have not managed to earn 
high school diplomas.26 
You get the idea. Only if non-high-school-graduates' failings are 
their own moral fault and college-attenders are morally blameless 
does it make sense in moral terms to deny a full stake to the former 
while granting a full stake to the latter. Neither condition is met. 
So what if we could persuade the authors that their denial of a 
"stake" to some young adults is indefensible, and they agreed to drop 
the restrictions? Would we then have a program of "fair opportu­
nity"? 
At this juncture it is appropriate to consider the manner in which 
the authors derive the amount of their proposed stake: $80,000. 
Ackerman and Alstott arrive at the $80,000 figure from the cost of tui­
tion at the average private college: $18,071 a year for four years.27 
They then state: 
As we have seen, eighty thousand dollars is enough to pay for four years 
of tuition at the average private college in the United States . . . .  
Four years at college will not magically eliminate the need for hard 
choices about career, family, and the meaning of life. Nonetheless, the 
skills and self-understandings that these students will gain will place them 
in a fair position to take responsibility for these choices. At the very 
least, they will not be locked into dead-end jobs or locked out of the vast 
range of cultural opportunities open to them as citizens of the twenty­
first century. In a rough-and-ready way, a college education serves to re­
deem the promise of maturity in contemporary society. 
But if this is so, eighty thousand dollars should also set the standard 
for the three out of four Americans who don't earn bachelor's degrees. 
As equal citizens, they too are entitled to confront their adult years with 
their heads held high while preparing themselves for the future as they 
see fit. . . . [I]f eighty thousand dollars suffices to provide the top quarter 
of the population with effective economic independence, shouldn't all 
other Americans obtain equivalent resources? [pp. 58-59; footnote omit­
ted] 
Here we begin to see the gears spinning in the authors' heads, and we 
can understand some of the motivations for AAP. The authors are 
clearly concerned by the financial difficulties that middle-class stu­
dents face today when they attend private colleges. Federally guaran­
teed Stafford Loans of up to $18,500 per year can only cover tuition; 
26. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the eventual dropout 
rates in 1997 for grades 10-12, ages 15-24, were 12% for children from low-income families, 
4% for children from middle-income families, and 2% for children from high-income fami­
lies. Philip Kaufman et al., DROPOUT RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 (U.S. Dep't of 
Educ. NCES 1999-082, 1999). Note here that Ackerman and Alstott are careful to suggest 
that degree requirements need to be kept tight, and would happily require tests. See p. 38 
n. *. That would make it even harder for the poor, given the poor quality of schools available 
to them, to obtain eligibility for their stakes. 
27. P. 55. 
1494 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1482 
living expenses must be financed in other ways. Students are emerg­
ing with unprecedentedly high levels of debt - levels that might well 
seem to compromise our sense that "the promise of maturity" has 
been redeemed. 
So why not do what other countries do? Why not provide a free 
college education for those who are admitted? 
One problem is that in most of those countries the free college 
education is available only at public institutions, and Ackerman and 
Alstott would like to ensure that the best and the brightest students 
(like Dierdre's Harvard- and Yale-bound classmates) have opportuni­
ties to select freely among America's many fine private institutions 
and are not restricted to choosing among the elite public institutions, 
most of which charge high tuition to nonresidents in any event. The 
only remaining possibility is some form of voucher, and that is the ba­
sis for AAP: at its core, one finds a $20,000 per year federal college 
education voucher. And its major effect will likely be to shift enroll­
ment from public to private universities.28 
It is illuminating to consider why Ackerman and Alstott did not 
stop there. What would have been wrong with a proposal simply to 
provide vouchers to cover the cost of college for any student who gets 
in (with repayment obligations along the lines spelled out in the 
book)? The answer clearly has to do with the fact that not everyone 
gets admitted to a college, and with some sense that it would be unfair 
to help those fortunate high school graduates who do without helping 
the unfortunates who do not. 
The unfairness here is not so obvious as one might assume. One 
might defend subsidized college as a kind of cost equalization system. 
After all, young adults who attend college face a set of expenses that 
are not incurred by high school graduates who do not attend. And it is 
not self-evidently unfair to eliminate those cost barriers for all those 
who must face them without doing anything for those whose lives do 
not carry such added costs. 
Ultimately, however, we are no more persuaded by that argument 
than are Ackerman and Alstott. For college attendance is a mixed 
good, part public (the entire society benefits if some of its citizens 
have advanced educations) and part private. But the private aspect 
predominates. The person who is educated captures most of the re­
turns to education, and those returns provide an excellent return on 
the investment in tuition.29 While it might be important for the gov-
28. At present 75% of Americans do not earn four-year college degrees, see pp. 51, 58, 
and Ackerman and Alstott assume that 73% will not attend four-year colleges even after 
stakeholding goes into effect, see p. 220. So the main use of the money will be not to create 
new college graduates, but to broaden the choices of those who would already have gone to 
college. 
29. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger, Estimates of the Economic Return to 
Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1171 (1994) (predicting 
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ernment to take steps to ensure that credit is available for all who 
would attend college, or perhaps to ensure that need-based subsidies 
exist, there would seem to be no cause for an across-the-board subsidy 
for those who would invest in an already profitable enterprise. 
A different defense might describe subsidized college as a hard­
eamed prize for the meritorious. If a race is fair, then there is nothing 
wrong with providing a prize for the winner and not the loser. Yet we 
surely understand why Ackerman and Alstott might not want to rest 
on that notion either. As we have noted earlier, whatever else they 
may be, the first eighteen years of life in America hardly look like a 
free sprint across a level playing field. 
And so there is great attraction to the idea that, if one is going to 
provide college tuition vouchers for college students, then one should 
provide something for the non-college-bound as well. It might seem 
unfair to do otherwise. Even if the concept of unfairness seems too 
strong, one might still believe that there are political advantages to 
coupling a college voucher program for the haves with a different car­
rot for the have-nots. 
As before, one must not mistake the universal distribution of 
equal-sized grants for the achievement of true equality. Indeed, the 
authors surely exaggerate when they suggest that universal $80,000 
grants would enable all young high school graduates to "enjoy the 
kind of relative economic independence that many children of the up­
per middle class take for granted today" (pp. 192-93). Upper-middle­
class children carry a lifelong advantage in the form of priceless cul­
tural and social capital.30 They may draw on their parents' experience 
and sophistication for valuable advice at critical moments. Moreover, 
preexisting wealth differences will leave intact the distinction between 
those who graduate from college with small amounts of debt and those 
who emerge with enough wealth to attend graduate school or start a 
business, buy a house, and pay for their own children's private 
schooling - thereby perpetuating their privileged position into the 
next generation. Indeed, to the extent that stakeholding increases ac­
cess to private university education at the undergraduate level, the 
that each additional year of schooling increases wages by 12-16%); Paul E. Gabriel, Esti­
mating the Returns to College: A Longitudinal Analysis, 2 APPLIED ECON. LE1TERS 255 
(1995) (estimating 12-15% rate of return for white males completing four years of college 
during early 1980s). To be sure, not everyone experiences the success the averages describe. 
Wrong economic choices are nonetheless made: students major in dying fields, or they fol­
low their hearts into the arts and humanities and never earn enough to repay their debts. 
But it seems to make little sense to relieve college graduates entirely of the consequences of 
their choices (some of which might in fact have improved their lives in countless nonmone­
tary ways), particularly if the only way to do so is to take on the added cost of subsidizing 
those who achieve economic success. 
30. See PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN 
EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (Richard Nice trans., SAGE Publications 1977) 
(1970); see also Malamud, supra note 18, at 1880-82. 
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likely result will be that a private university degree will have less social 
value than it does at present. Graduate school or other indicia of so­
cial status will simply replace it as a badge of distinction.31 
The distribution of an equal demogrant would surely not produce 
equal opportunity. Equal opportunity would of course require the 
least advantaged to receive more assistance than the most advantaged. 
Still, equal demogrants would provide more equal opportunity than 
the status quo. Would they provide minimally fair opportunity to all? 
Suppose that by that term we mean that people with talent should, in a 
country as wealthy as America today, have at least the minimum re­
sources necessary to develop that talent. Surely for many people, the 
assured knowledge that they could afford to pay for college would 
make the difference between not having that minimal level of hope 
and having it. For others, whose talents call for entrepreneurial capi­
tal and/or experiences that college cannot provide, an $80,000 cash 
stake might not be enough. Suppose, instead, that what we mean by 
minimally fair opportunity is that all Americans ought to have the 
"equivalent" resources (p. 58) to protect themselves from the indigni­
ties of reversals of economic fortune. Why is it so clear that "equiva­
lence" can be achieved with merely equal resources when the likeli­
hood of economic misfortune is so much greater for those without 
college degrees? 
But that only brings us back to earlier questions. Why were 
Ackerman and Alstott unwilling to provide truly equal demogrants to 
all? Why did they choose to make the non-college-bound wait until 
age twenty-one? Why do the non-college-bound receive their stakes 
over a period of four years - a schedule that makes sense for the 
payment of college tuition but may not make sense for house down­
payments, business start-ups, or other legitimate uses of the funds? 
Why did they decide to provide a financially inferior stake to those 
who fail to complete high school? 
The limitations not only compromise the program's steps toward 
equality, they strike us as being equally inconsistent with their other 
guiding principle - antipaternalism. For when all else fails, the entire 
program makes perfectly clear that the authors believe that attending 
college - preferably a private college - is the right thing to do. 
Those who do not finish high school are deemed undeserving and 
31. For the dynamic nature of social hierarchies, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE 
NOBILITY 277 (Laurette C. Cfough trans., 1996) (1989) (distinguishing between "upward 
mobility" and "structural shift" - the latter being present when a seeming improvement in 
credentials or occupation in fact merely maintains a person's status relative to others who 
are also "upwardly mobile"); see also CULTIVATING DIFFERENCES: SYMBOLIC 
BOUNDARIES AND THE MAKING OF INEQUALITY 5 (Michele Lamont & Marcel Fournier 
eds., 1992) ("According to Bourdieu, if there is a principle of organization to all forms of 
social life, it is the logic of distinction. In any differentiated society, individuals, groups, and 
social classes cannot escape this logic - which brings them together while separating them 
from one another."). 
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treated accordingly. Those who finish high school but do not attend 
college receive full (if delayed) stakes, but both the size of the stake 
and its division into four-year increments make it clear to all that the 
program was not created with their needs in mind. A paternalist 
might well endorse the view that college graduation is vital for eco­
nomic survival in the modern American economy. Ackerman and 
Alstott eschew paternalism. But how else can their program be just­
ified? 
*** 
Permit us to shift our focus now, from matters of substance to mat­
ters of rhetoric. In writing their book, Ackerman and Alstott chose to 
use three rhetorical tropes that are so distracting that it becomes diffi­
cult to engage the substance of their proposals. None of them would 
be worthy of mention if it were an isolated exception in a 220-page 
book. But each is characteristic here, and together they warrant criti­
cal comment. 
The first trope might be called "overclaim now, qualify later." 
This is a kind of intellectual bait-and-switch, whereby the authors as­
sociate AAP with an extraordinarily lofty ideal, and then, later, admit 
that, of course, AAP realizes that ideal only incompletely. In their 
most exuberant voice, Ackerman and Alstott claim that stakeholding 
offers Americans: 
• "real equality of opportunity" (p. 7); 
• a "fair chance to pursue happiness" (p. 9); 
• "a fair share of the patrimony left by preceding generations" 
(p. 9); 
• "a priceless buffer against the predictable shocks of the market-
place" (p. 10); 
· 
• "a cushion in hard times and a source of entrepreneurial energy 
in better ones" (p. 10); 
• "a beacon of hope" "[f]or those growing up in the ghettos of 
America" (p. 10); 
• "economic independence for all" (pp. 11, 25), and 
• "a genuine alternative to social division and moral drift" (p. 217). 
At other points, they make surprisingly broad claims about the collat­
eral effects of their proposal: 
• "[Stakeholding] will . . .  inject much-needed competition among 
universities for the stakeholding dollar" (pp. 10, 53). 
• "[S]takeholding will create a certain space for civic reflection . . .  " 
(p. 185). 
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• "[S]takeholding will also encourage a purer form of patriotism" 
(p. 186). 
We don't mind bold claims, but something is amiss here. These are 
not the conclusions that follow upon pages of analysis. They come as 
disembodied pronouncements in the text, and then become the prem­
ises for further discussion. Perhaps that is an appropriate way to write 
a lobbyist's brief. But it is frustrating and confusing for someone who 
is just trying to figure out what direction public policy ought to be 
take. 
Nor is the problem ameliorated when, in other passages, the 
authors seem to be making much more modest claims: 
• "We do not suppose that our proposal suffices to achieve the 
ideal of equal opportunity. Not only educational reform but the 
special problems posed by serious physical or mental handicaps 
are beyond the scope of our initiative" (p. 34). 
• "To be sure, it only takes one large step toward equal opportu­
nity" (p. 42). 
• "Stakeholding cannot directly compensate for differentials in 
early education and childhood experiences. But it can guarantee 
access for all college-ready students regardless of their parents' 
income and wealth" (p. 52). 
• "Even if stakeholding were adopted, we would be far from an 
America in which all children began adult life with first-rate edu­
cations and roughly equal resources, regardless of their parents' 
success or failure in the marketplace" (p. 103). 
Rather than helping to clarify the authors' broader claims, these more 
measured statements serve only to exacerbate our confusion about 
why the aggressive claims were made in the first place. 
The second trope is a seemingly unembarrassed misanthropy, di­
rected at everyone but the solid college-attending upwardly mobile 
middle class. Ackerman and Alstott patronize the working class and 
demonize the wealthy. Four examples (again, the emphasis is ours): 
., "Joe Six-Pack is every bit as much of an American as Joe Col­
lege . . . . Because these high school graduates are not going to 
college, they will have to wait until their twenties to gain access to 
their stakes. But we do not think that this delay will prove very 
controversial. Most high school graduates would themselves con­
cede that they need some seasoning in the school of hard knocks 
before they can be trusted with eighty thousand dollars" (p. 56). 
o "[A larger stake would be unwise . . . .  ] [W]ould it really be good 
to transform the average American into a spoiled brat living in 
New York on an overly large trust fund?" (p. 192). 
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• "It will be easy for culture critics to sneer as Joe American uses 
his stake to agonize over the car he should buy or the clothes he 
should wear" (p. 192). 
• "Some spoiled brats from the suburbs will blow their stakes, while 
millions of poor kids from the center city will make the most of 
their one big chance" (p. 197). 
What kind of intellectual work is all this doing? Maybe it is merely 
intended to show that Ackerman and Alstott want everyone to be 
more like the solid American scion of the middle class - Joe College. 
Maybe it is intended to show that members of the working classes -
Joe Six-Pack or Joe American - are hopelessly vain and must pass 
through the crucible of hard experience before achieving the rational 
temperament that is the middle-class birthright. The fact that some 
"hard knocks" have long-term negative consequences seems not to 
matter to the authors as they insist that members of the working 
classes wait an extra four years to start working toward economic 
adulthood. Maybe these comments are intended to show that the 
wealthy and the suburbanite young adults are really spoiled brats for 
whom we should have no sympathy. Coming from two members of 
the Yale Law School faculty, however, it all reads as decidedly inap­
propriate. What is the point of antipaternalism if it is mixed with such 
obvious disrespect? 
Through their negative typecasting of all but the solid college­
attending middle class, the authors miss much of the moral drama that 
will face the new stakeholders from sub-middle-class families. Young 
adults will be under tremendous moral pressure to use stake resources 
to help other members of their families - be it parents, grandparents, 
or non-stake-eligible siblings. Young African Americans will likely 
feel particularly strong pressure in this regard, both because their ex­
tended families are more likely to experience economic downturns32 
and because the cultural norms of the community lean toward greater 
interdependency.33 Women will face particularly harsh choices. A 
woman can bet on the stability of her marriage and use her stake funds 
to substitute for her paycheck in order to stay home with her children 
- or, instead, she can look at the hard statistics on divorce in this 
country34 and take a marriage-threatening stand by investing in her 
32 See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 967-88 (1997) (describing the economic precariousness of the 
Black middle class). 
33. See John Simpkins, All in the Family, The NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1996, at 27, 27 
("[T]his endless succession of family obligations can make it impossible to accumulate 
wealth. Everyone survives, but people with the ability and opportunity are prevented from 
moving ahead."); see also Rose Merry Rivers & John Scanzoni, Social Families Among 
African Americans: Policy Implications for Children, in BLACK FAMILIES 333, 341-43 
(Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 3d ed. 1997). 
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own education and career. The authors acknowledge the difficult 
choices young adults will face.35 But they trivialize these choices when 
they insist on characterizing young people as vain, ignorant, short­
sighted, or spoiled. 
The third stylistic trope is a willingness to construct hypothetical 
straw critics of their proposal (styled as welfarists, libertarians, or 
communitarians), and then to caricature and ridicule them. Once 
again, a few examples should illustrate the point (here, too, the em­
phasis is ours): 
• "This question [whether there should be restrictions on how a 
stake is used] bears the mark of the welfarist mindset" (p. 9). 
• "We do not join those who would cheerfully sweep away the leg­
islative achievements of the Progressives, the New Deal, and the 
Great Society" (p. 11). 
• "[T]he libertarian would have us ignore the more subtle, yet still 
pervasive, ways in which educational inequalities shape the future 
capacities of children to form and achieve their objectives in later 
life" (p. 23). 
• "We disagree [with communitarians] . . . . It is simply silly to sup­
pose that elected politicians, of all people, could lead a sensitive 
moral dialogue . . .  " (p. 43). 
• "At this point, we expect, libertarians will begin squirming . . . .  
But . . .  [ o ]ur hypothetical libertarian has cried 'thief one time too 
often in condemning the trusteeship tax [a proposed annual tax 
equal to 2% of wealth]" (pp. 85-86). 
Once again, we do not understand what intellectual work these pas­
sages are doing. Why are Ackerman and Alstott bothering to respond 
to critics who are imprisoned by their mindsets, who would cheerfully 
sweep achievements away, who ignore subtleties, who make silly sup­
positions about the capacities of politicians, and who cry thief? Why 
are they not identifying the more serious questions about their pro­
posal and simply addressing them? 
*** 
These rhetorical distractions might be only minor distractions if 
they were only a little bit of clutter in a book that was willing to de-
34. See, e.g., Larry L. Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between 
Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 485 (1990) (projecting that 
60% of first marriages will end in divorce if current trends persist). 
35. They in fact seem to endorse the choice to stay at home, saying that "[i]n the short 
term, stakeholding will enhance the power of women to make the most sensible accommoda­
tion to an unjust reality." See pp. 207-08. Sensible for whom? The children, or the women 
in marriages of which half will end in divorce? 
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fend its premises head-on. But The Stakeholder Society is not that 
book. 
Take, for example, the antipatemalist premise. Over the past 
three decades, several prominent economists and policy analysts have 
supported the idea of giving every young person a "human capital ac­
count" that could be used for education and training over the course 
of their lives.36 Ackerman and Alstott dismiss such proposals as fol­
lows: 
[A]s a matter of principle, we reject this notion of freedom-within­
boundaries . . . .  [A] large middle group will be denied real freedom. For 
them, building 'human capital' may not be the best life plan. . . . [T]hey 
may put a premium on some seemingly frivolous, but to them important, 
item like foreign travel or an unforgettable wedding. We believe that 
these young men and women should be no less free than their college­
bound peers or the richer kids across town who are making similar deci­
sions with their parents' money. We are repelled by programs that require 
kids from the wrong side of the tracks to justify their lives to a government 
bureaucrat. [pp. 215-216; emphasis added] 
Ackerman and Alstott do not seem to care that this form of argu­
ment proves way too much. As far as they are concerned, once one 
has decided to use a public program to transfer resources to a recipi­
ent, any restrictions on the use of those resources become threats to 
both liberty (the recipient's freedom to choose without having to an­
swer to a "government bureaucrat") and equality (the recipient's abil­
ity to be as frivolous as a richer kid). 
This principle would seem to require that all in-kind programs, 
from public schools to food stamps, from subsidized housing to Medi­
caid, be "cashed out." Universal health care would be an infringement 
on the individual's right to buy cigarettes rather than penicillin. The 
fact that in-kind programs have expanded rapidly in America over the 
past thirty years, while cash programs have stagnated, might lead one 
to wonder why the general public has missed Ackerman and Alstott's 
point. 
The answer is that, in a capitalist economy rooted in a conception 
of private property, the collective decision to tax and redistribute is 
morally significant. It involves a joint decision to infringe on the 
"freedom" of the taxpayer. The principles that justify that decision, 
grounded in commitments to the collective good, serve just as well to 
justify restrictions on the "freedom" of the recipient. If the reason to 
take money away from the rich is that we want to enhance opportuni­
ties for the less fortunate, that same reason is perfectly adequate to say 
36. Ackerman and Alstott's cites include ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN 168-71 
{1988); James Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 77, 92-
93 (Kermit Gordon ed., 1968); and William A. Klein, A Proposal for a Universal Personal 
Capital Account, 268 n.56 (Institute for Research on Poverty Working Paper No. 422-77, 
1977). 
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that we want to spend the money in ways that will have that effect for 
more than just a day. 
That brings us to our final criticism. Ackerman and Alstott have 
proposed a very expensive program. The $255 billion per year they 
propose to spend on stakeholding is almost as much as the nation cur­
rently spends on public primary and secondary education.37 But they 
offer no reason why anyone not hobbled by their self-imposed antipa­
ternalism constraint would choose to spend the money on stakehold­
ing rather than on programs targeted at the needs of the most disad­
vantaged members of our society. For Ackerman and Alstott, "the 
point of stakeholding," first and foremost, "is to liberate each citizen 
from government" (p. 9). But for many of their readers - and cer­
tainly for us - the point of social spending on this scale should be to 
liberate the most disadvantaged among us from their dire unmet social 
and economic needs. While we are very cognizant that social and eco­
nomic inequalities are meaningful and are a matter of concern even 
when they occur among those in the upper half of the American in­
come distribution,38 we find the unmet needs of those in the bottom 
half far more compelling on a moral level. 
If we had $255 billion a year to spend, we would spend it on pro­
grams aimed at the massive inequalities experienced by poor children 
in their early years. Consider the case of families with one child, un­
der the age of six years old. About 40% of them have annual incomes 
of $50,000 a year or more; 10% have incomes of more than $100,000 
per year. But over a million such families - 18% of the total - have 
less than $15,000 in annual income.39 Rates of childhood poverty vary 
by race and ethnicity: in 1998, 10.6% of non-Hispanic White children 
were living in poverty, compared with 34.4% of Hispanic children and 
36.7% of Black children.40 The disproportionate concentration of 
poverty within certain minority groups provides still another reason 
why we align ourselves with those who find the greatest moral signifi­
cance in the needs of America's least fortunate.41 
The problem is that poverty programs, to be effective, need gov­
ernment. They need social workers. They need people with expertise 
37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 1999 tbl. 512 {119th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT], <http://www.census.gov/govs/school/96tables.pdf> {showing U.S. expenditures 
of $264,240,000,000 and $279, 353,000,000 for fiscal year 1995 and 1996, respectively). 
38. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 18. 
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, Income in the United States: 1998 (P60-206) tbl. 5 {last re­
vised Mar. 3, 2000), <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income98.htm>. 
40. See id. app. B, tbl. B-2. 
41. See, e.g., GOSTA EsPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE 
CAPITALISM {1990); ROBERT G. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE {1988); Thomas c. Grey, 
Poverty and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 
877 {1976). 
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that poor parents lack. They are paternalistic at their core. And they 
are expensive. Ackerman and Alstott report that the sums we now 
spend on Project Headstart are "piddling," that a "first-class program" 
along the outlines of Headstart would cost billions of dollars, and that 
"our society's failure to make such basic investments in its youngest 
and most vulnerable citizens is simply scandalous" (p. 28) . 
Why, then, divert $255 billion of scarce funds to a stakeholding 
program? Why dress that program in the rhetoric of "equal opportu­
nity," and encourage people to believe in the moral fault of those who 
do not survive the inequalities of childhood and emerge as 
stakeholders? If a prior commitment to antipaternalism is the reason, 
why not write a more humble book, one that admits the social costs of 
antipatemalism and plainly advocates stakeholding as the best an anti­
paternalist can do? Why not go even further and reevaluate antipa­
ternalism - especially if antipaternalism means stakeholding is the 
best we can do? 
